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I. Introduction
The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 were the most serious terrorist attacks on a state and its population.
2 Those attacks have also had important consequences in international law. 3 The September 11th attacks changed some important legal categories and imposed the need to rethink them. 4 They also impacted the American justice system because "[ejnormous government resources were funneled toward the investigation and prosecution of terrorist perpetrators." 5 In response to the terrorist attacks and as a means to assert jurisdiction over the "captured terrorists," 6 the President of the United States issued the "Presidential Order on Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism" in order to try the perpetrators in "military commissions." 7 The proposed military commissions will be specifically authorized to prosecute the captured terrorists. However, the existing system of terrorist prosecutions seems to provide unfair trials. The Military Order guaranteed very few procedural safeguards under international law.
Part II of this paper discusses the definition of terrorism and analyzes international law aspects of the global war on terrorism (GWOT). International law considerations pervaded the GWOT and it is necessary to analyze what role international criminal law should play in the GWOT. Part III discusses the current system of terrorist prosecutions. Unlike historic examples where the tribunals were held after the end of hostilities, these prosecutions will be taking place during an on-going armed conflict.
8 Part IV examines terrorism as an international crime. It also identifies several problems before suspected terrorists are tried by the military commissions. Part V reviews the problem areas in prosecuting terrorists and concludes by arguing that the policy of the United States on prosecution of terrorists needs a major revision before it can be used. In conclusion, the paper proposes that procedural protections must be provided for the captured terrorists. Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002) . 5 See, e.g., Seth N. Stratton, Taking Terrorists to Court: A Practical Evaluation of Civil Suits Against Terrorists Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 9 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 27 (2004) (discussing civil suits against terrorists). 6 For the purposes of this paper, the term "captured terrorists" will be used narrowly to include only the detainees held on U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo, Cuba. 7 See Military Order No. 222 of November 13, 2001 , Title 3, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 2(a) (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Military Order] (authorizing detention of non-citizens found to have participated in terrorist acts or associated with members of al Qaeda, and trials by military commissions). 8 See generally Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 345, 348 (2002) (asserting that "[a] l Qaeda captures are suspected of past or future terrorist crimes, not violations of the laws of war, and no legal basis exists to detain or try them as 'unlawful combatants'").
II. Overview of Modern Terrorism

A. Definition and International Nature of Modern Terrorism
Terrorism has been discussed in international law for a long time. Countries often struggle with the distinction between "terrorism" and "legitimate struggle of an occupied people for liberation" because there has been no accepted definition of terrorism. 9 However, the dispute over what constitutes terrorism denotes part of the problem: what is terrorism to someone is heroism to others; "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." 10 Scholars are divided about the definition of terrorism." However, it is essential to provide a common definition. 12 The causes of terrorism and the political motivation of the terrorists are relevant to the problem of defining terrorism. Without an accurate definition, it becomes impossible to recognize the weaknesses in terrorist prosecutions. This definition can also establish the necessary elements to convict the captured terrorists. The issue here is the difficulty in characterizing the nature of terrorism because terrorism is a term of uncertain legal content. 13 However, the lack of "definitional consensus" is not an obstacle to the jurisdiction over terrorists.
14 Although the international community does not agree on the definition of terrorism, consensus is emerging as to the broad meaning of terrorism. Some governments define terrorism as individual acts of violence only if they are employed merely for personal gain or caprice. 15 For most the term "terrorism" includes certain acts carried out in an attempt to coerce the authorities or population of a country in order to achieve political, religious, or ideological 9 
JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 297 (2004).
ROBERTA ARNOLD, THE ICC AS A NEW INSTRUMENT FOR REPRESSING TERRORISM 4 (2004).
See, e.g., Azubuike, supra note 1, at 137 (arguing that terrorism is an act of violence aims. 16 Terrorism is also defined as a crime in certain treaties that are binding on the state parties to exercise jurisdiction over such crimes. 17 Domestic terrorism involves acts that occur primarily within a country while international terrorism involves acts that occur primarily outside the country. 18 Terrorism is simply defined in the U.S. code as "premeditated [or] politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents." 19 Although there are many definitions of terrorism, most definitions have five basic elements: (1) the perpetration of violence by whatever means; 20 (2) the targeting of innocent civilians; 21 (3) with the intent to cause violence or with wanton disregard for its consequences; 22 (4) for the purpose of causing fear, coercing, or intimidating an enemy; 23 and (5) in order to achieve some political, military, ethnic, ideological, or religious goals. 24 Based on most definitions of terrorism, two elements are most critical: the targeting of civilians; and the existence of an ideological or political purpose. However, problems with terrorist prosecution are obvious -international consensus has never been achieved on a precise definition of terrorism and who can be responsible for it. Regardless of a universally accepted definition of terrorism, a common distinguishing characteristic of terrorism is a "resort to a strategy of terror or violence in order to achieve goals that include a power outcome."
25 This is true whether the perpetrator of the terrorist act is a state or a 16 JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT, TERRORISM LAW: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE WAR ON TERROR 4 (2d ed. 2004) . 17 See ARNOLD supra note 9, at 14 (addressing terrorism in a universal and comprehensive way and analyzing anti-terrorism conventions). 18 Stratton, supra note 4, at 41. non-state actor. As criminal acts, terrorism seeks to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or a government.
26
The international community agrees regarding two facts: terrorism is bad; and there is no consensus on how to define it. 27 Yet terrorism can be generally defined as methods of terror or violence that targets civilians for political or ideological purposes. Terrorism is in fact not a specific term for a specific crime or action. It is an umbrella term under which a range of actions are taken by agents either sporadically or continuously to obtain their end. 28 Terrorism is not a philosophy or a movement; it is a method. 29 International terrorism is generally understood as "terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country."
30
International terrorism involves "violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state.""' Supporting terrorist activities in another state is often called indirect aggression and terrorist activities were listed as "terrorism offenses."
B. Terrorism as an Armed Attack
Another approach to characterize terrorism is to define it as an "act of war." Some argue that "international terrorism" is the act of violence containing an international element or violating an international norm.
34
"Domestic terrorism" is usually included in state criminal statutes under acts committed by common criminals. 35 Regardless, terrorism is both a crime and a method to perpetrate other crimes. The international crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity can also be considered methods of terrorism intentionally designed to intimidate and cause fear in a civilian population.
36
Today terrorist groups are primarily motivated by ideology.
37 "The United States is not at war with a state, but against terrorism, an ideology."
38 These groups generally have fewer members and do not have the capability of changing a regime. 39 However, "ideologically motivated groups are even more violent than insurgent or revolutionary groups because of the strength of their beliefs and the self-perpetuating belief that their cause is rig ht. 'L L. 559, 566(1999) . 40 Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 85 (noting that even though ideologically motivated groups are generally smaller than insurgent or revolutionary groups, their "terror-violence techniques are capable of destabilizing a regime and inflicting harm on members of its society to achieve politically related, often vengeful, goals"). 41 Id. (noting that the term "international terrorism" has become synonymous with "small, ideologically motivated groups, whose strategies of terror violence are designed to propagate a political message, destabilize a regime, inflict social harm as political vengeance, and elicit overreactive state responses likely to create a political crisis"). 42 See generally NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 6 (Feb. 2003) (stating that the international environment defines the boundaries within which the terrorists' strategies take shape). of their actions. The global environment, "with its resultant terrorist interconnectivity," and WMD are changing the nature of terrorism.
44
The September 11 th attacks were acts of war because al Qaeda executed the attacks to achieve an ideological and political objective -changing the United States foreign policy in the Middle East. 45 The international community recognized that the acts perpetrated by members of al Qaeda amounted to armed attack and the United States and its allies had the right to use force in selfdefense.
46
Transnational terrorism by non-state actors has become the new means and method of warfare in the twenty-first century. After the September 11th attacks, the international community unanimously expressed its sympathy for the United States and strongly condemned these acts of terrorism. The U.N. Security Council met in emergency session on September 12, 2001, and adopted resolution 1368, which states that "[t]he attacks constitute a threat to international peace and security." The resolution referred explicitly to "the right of individual or collective self-defense" in accordance with the U.N. Charter. 53 The Security Council never explicitly authorized the use of armed force in response to the September 11th attacks.
54 However, the resolution is an important example of international law being applied to combat terrorism because it called on states to "work together to bring to justice the perpetrators" of the September 11th attacks.
55
In response to these terrorist attacks on the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 56 invoked Article V 57 of the treaty for the are not entitled to prisoners of war (POW) status per GPW upon capture, the U.S. policy dictates that they will still receive the treatment and protections of GPW The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
CHARTER OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION.
first time in its history. NATO recognized the individual and collective selfdefense as stated in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.' Shortly thereafter, the President stressed that the United States was prosecuting the GWOT. 60 The United States identified "al Qaeda as the group responsible" and began using its diplomatic and military forces to respond to this "act of war." 62 Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits the threat or use of force and obliges all members of the U.N. to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 63 However, the Article 51 64 exception for selfdefense is the only explicit exception to Article 2(4). 65 Under the doctrine of self-defense, a state may resort to the use of armed force only in response to an "armed attack" or perhaps, the threat of an "imminent" armed attack. 66 Selfdefense is an exception to the general duty of all states to respect the territorial integrity of other states and the only exception to the prohibition on the use of non-U.N. authorized force. 67 A legal basis to use force exists in the GWOT Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
because the United States is acting in self-defense. Under the United States interpretation of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the United States has the right to use force in self-defense against an imminent or continuing threat to its i
• • 69 sovereignty and citizens.
Applicability of the Geneva Conventions in the Global War on Terrorism
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols of 1977 are the documents that currently outline the humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflict. The Conventions become applicable at the beginning of hostilities.
70
However, the application of international law to terrorism is problematic in that there is uncertainty among governments and scholars as to exactly how international law is applicable. 71 The terrorists whom the United States faces today are not easily dealt with under international law. There is also disagreement pertaining to whether international terrorism triggers the law of war or whether humanitarian law governs. 72 Prior to September 11th, terrorist attacks and operations against terrorists were traditionally treated as neither international nor internal armed conflict.
73
Terrorists have been considered criminals to whom law enforcement must respond and any military operations against terrorists were considered below the armed conflict spectrum.
74
Many opined that the law of war applies to international terrorists because the September 11th attacks were "acts of war against the United States." 75 The September 11th terrorist attacks resemble acts of war because they are extraordinarily severe, directed from abroad by an organized group, and directed against a state as a whole. 76 Yet it is not clear under international law their acts. The Geneva Conventions set out a comprehensive legal framework aimed at protecting captured combatants and civilians during armed conflict. Common Article 2 provides that the Geneva Conventions apply in all cases of international armed conflict. 80 Common Article 3 establishes minimum standards of treatment for individuals captured during internal armed conflicts and provides that in internal armed conflicts each party to the conflict shall observe certain minimum standards. 81 It should be noted, however, that the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions expanded the application of the law of war to "the wars of national liberation." 82 The United States has not ratified the Additional Protocols. The inclusion of this type of conflict within the definition of "international armed conflict" has been rejected by the United States. It is an "impermissible expansion of the laws of war and sponsorship, there is "no good legal reason to recognize 'terrorist organizations' as combatants under the laws of armed conflicts"); Paust, supra note 54, at 683 (commenting that the United States "cannot be at 'war' with al Qaeda as such," absent state sponsorship). 77 84 The article makes it quite clear that under GPW, the Taliban soldiers, who represented and defended the Afghanistan nation, must be considered POW. Although not recognized by the majority of the international community, including the United States, the Taliban was the de facto government of Afghanistan during the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
85
The United States agrees that the Geneva Conventions apply to the Taliban, but their failure to distinguish themselves properly from the civilian population and their failure to comply with the law of war resulted in the refusal of the United States to give Taliban detainees POW status pursuant to Article 4 of GPW.
86
After the defeat of the Taliban regime, any remaining armed conflict between the coalition forces and organized armed elements of the Taliban regime arguably should be characterized as a non-international armed conflict.
87
Common Article 3 applies to the Taliban detainees, but non-international armed conflicts do not trigger the Geneva Conventions' full protection. 88 All such persons are entitled to humane treatment and, in the case of criminal charges, fair trial by "a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." 89 The non-international armed conflict traditionally involves the concept of "civil wars" or "internal conflicts." 91 The conflict with al Qaeda does not fit well into this paradigm of non-international armed conflict. According to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, this includes all cases of declared war or of any other aimed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
92 Neither Protocol I nor Common Article 3 has provisions addressing international armed conflict between a state and a transnational terrorist group with no control over a territory. When a state undertakes military action in self-defense against a terrorist organization, the terrorists themselves do not become privileged combatants under the law of armed conflict.
93 They are unlawful combatants and are not entitled to POW status.
94
They have no combatant immunity and can be punished for all hostile acts, including the killing of soldiers, because they have no right to participate directly in hostilities.
95
The September 11th terrorist attacks directly targeted civilians for ideological and political purposes. The attacks did not occur in an armed conflict within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions. The terrorists are unlawful combatants and are not entitled to POW status. However, the Geneva Conventions are inadequate to address whether the captured terrorists are "protected persons" under GC IV. International treaties, pertaining to non-state actors such as al Qaeda, should be developed to address international legal inadequacies and gaps concerning transnational terrorists. Levie, supra note 80, at 479.
III. Analysis of Terrorist Prosecutions
Geneva Conventions, supra note 48, art. 3. 93 JA 422, supra note 36, at 388. 94 Id.
See generally Callen, supra note 74, at 1031 (noting that unlawful combatants are not protected under GPW). 96 ARNOLD, supra note 9, at 310-11. recently, the law enforcement approach has prevailed.
This approach considers terrorist attacks as criminal acts to be addressed by domestic prosecution. 98 The doctrine of "universal jurisdiction" allows national courts to try cases of the gravest crimes against humanity, even if these crimes are not committed in the national territory and even if they are committed by government leaders of other states." The concept is not new, though states have shown an increasing willingness to enlarge the zone of their jurisdiction and to prosecute or extradite those in high places. Universal jurisdiction allows the states to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses in international law such as war crimes.
100 National jurisdiction over terrorists can be obtained through universal jurisdiction. Therefore, any national tribunal can try terrorists.
There is no question that the September 11th attacks violated basic criminal statutes. The hijacking of the aircraft involved offenses punishable under both the United States law and international law. 101 In addition, the acts resulted in multiple murders under both the United States federal law and the state laws of Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia.
102 There are numerous precedents in the United States in which similar acts were dealt with under criminal law processes in federal district courts.
103 Past examples include trials for the bombings of 1993 World Trade Center, 1995 Oklahoma City Federal Building, and 1998 U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
104
The United States can hold the trials of the September 11th terrorist suspects because the attacks took place on U.S. territory and the majority of victims were U.S. nationals.
105
The President decided to establish military commissions to try terrorists under his constitutional authority as the GRAY, supra note 2, at 165. 98 Mundis, supra note 59, at 321. 99 Schabas, supra note 13, at 912. 100 MURPHY, supra note 8, at 286. 101 See, e.g., Trahan, supra note 11, at 508 (arguing that a U.S. district court or an international tribunal would be preferable in terrorist prosecutions). 102 Jinks, supra note 72, at 42. Judges and prosecutors are to be U.S. military officers, reporting to the President as the Commander-in-Chief."
6 Military commissions will consist of a panel of three to seven military officers as well as one or more alternate members who have been "determined to be competent to perform the duties involved" by the Defense Secretary or his designee."
7 The presiding officer must be a judge advocate in any of the U.S. armed forces, but need not be a military judge." 8 The presiding officer has the authority to decide evidentiary matters and interlocutory motions, or to refer them to the commission or certify them to the "Appointing Authority" for decision." 9 The presiding officer has the power to close any portion of the proceedings in accordance with the Military Commission Order.
120
Military commissions could operate extraterritorially.
121
Although the procedural rules stipulate that defendants are to be presumed innocent and that guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, the commissions do not require adherence to rules of evidence used in the United States. 122 An affirmative vote of two-thirds of the commission members is required for conviction and sentence, although a unanimous verdict will be required to impose a death penalty. 123 In contrast, at courts-martial, "the UCMJ requires a three-fourths majority for any sentence exceeding ten years, abides by civil court evidentiary rules, permits an accused a say in the composition of the panel of judges, is reviewable by a civilian court and, ultimately, by the United States Supreme Court, and permits a more generous standard of appellate review." 124 114 18U.S.C. app. § 696, 1-16(2000) . 115 Pitts-Kiefer, supra note 37, at 908. The accused does not have the right to refuse counsel in favor of self-representation. 129 The accused has the right to view evidence the prosecution intends to present as well as any exculpatory evidence known, as long as it is not deemed to be protected under the Military Commission Order. 130 The accused may also obtain witnesses and documents "to the extent necessary and reasonably available as determined by the Presiding Officer and subject to secrecy determinations."' 31 GPW would likely not prevent the trial of protected persons before military commissions. GPW only requires that protected persons be permitted: (1) free choice of counsel; (2) the right to present evidence and call witnesses; and (3) rights of appeal "provided for by the laws applied by the court." The Military Commission Order establishes a multi-layered appeals process. These procedures grant detainees a right of appeal before a "Review Panel"; thus, satisfying GPW's appeal requirements.
134 They do not provide appeal rights to a court (even for a decision to execute) but to another military ELSEA, supra note 113, at 17. REV. 1407 REV. , 1417 REV. (2002 (arguing that these "protections" turn out to be almost no benefit to the accused at all). 133 Callen, supra note 74, at 1035. panel, to which civilians temporarily can be appointed as military officers. 135 However, a defendant may be able to petition a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the jurisdiction of the military commission. 138 Trials in military commissions will not be open to the public in certain circumstances.
139 Given their structure and rules, military commissions may well violate the core principles of international law, such as the right to a fair trial before an independent court.
140
The role of the commanding officer provides another way to misuse military commissions. Unlike other prosecutions, military commissions are "commander-driven," and the rules are written on a "case-by-case basis."
141
Military commissions are widely viewed as susceptible to executive pressure because they are directly accountable to the military chain of command.
142
Under the UCMJ, the power to convene a general court-martial or a military commission is a function of command. 143 The power is personal and cannot be delegated; the convening authority personally appoints the members of the courts-martial or military commissions. 144 Besides, the captured terrorists at Guantanamo have already been called "killers" by the President, who will also have the final review of guilty verdicts coming from military commissions.
146 It seems that the cases against these captured terrorists have been pre-judged by the final review authority.
The right to a fair trial is recognized by all major political, social, religious, and cultural systems. 147 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights requires everyone be entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.
148 Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "[ejveryone charged with a penal offense has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defense."
149 Even in times of war, GPW requires that anyone accused of a crime be afforded "all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."
All the other international conventions contain similar guarantees of fair judicial process. It is unpersuasive why the protections of the United States criminal justice system are limited to United States nationals. However, the Supreme Court held that requiring protections for nonresident enemy aliens before the United States courts, particularly in war time, would "hamper the war effort by diverting resources to supervise and care for aliens before and during hearings on petitions for habeas corpus." 160 In Quirin the Supreme Court denied habeas relief to eight Germans detained during trial by a military commission. They were held on charges that they violated the law of war (specifically articles 81 and 82 of the Articles of War) and that they had committed acts of sabotage and spying. 161 The Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the commission. The Court reasoned that article 15 of the Articles of War gave Congress its authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations and that this included sanctioning the jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons for violations Jinks, supra Most notably, the Court refused to be drawn into a discussion of the jurisdictional boundaries of military commissions when it stated; "we have no occasion now to define with meticulous care the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try persons according to the law of war."
163
The Court was reluctant to allow the war criminals standing in federal courts because to do so would "hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy, diminish the prestige of the United States commanders, and would result in a conflict between judicial and military opinion highly comforting to the enemies of the United States."
164 Nonresident aliens lost more procedural protections with the Court's subsequent decisions. 165 The holdings of the Court made it impossible to provide full procedural rights in the United States prosecutions of foreign unlawful combatants.' 66 Only U.S. citizens and resident aliens have procedural safeguards to a fair trial.
Thus, inapplicability of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the foreign defendants in military commissions would allow the United States to try captured terrorists with minimal procedural protections.' 67 A thorough discussion of due process is obviously well beyond the scope of this paper. However, the inability of nonresident aliens to receive protection under the Bill of Rights would render the procedures and safeguards irrelevant.
168 Non-citizen terrorists can be detained indefinitely pending trial. Even if acquitted by a military commission, some captured terrorists will not be released because of national security interests. 169 162 Id. 163 Id. 164 Clover, supra note 152, at 391 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 40). 165 See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9, 30 (1946) (upholding the legality of military commissions). See also United States v. Verdugo Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (noting that the historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to restrict searches and seizures conducted by the United States in domestic matters) (emphasis added). 166 Katyal & Tribe, supra note 50, at 1300. 167 Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 69, 72 (D.D.C., 2002) (holding that aliens outside the sovereign territory of the United States do not have rights to access U.S. courts to enforce the U.S. Constitution, that Guantanamo fell outside the sovereign territory of the United States, and that although Guantanamo detainees do have international rights, the way to enforce these would be through diplomatic channels). 168 Katyal & Tribe, supra note 50, at 1300.
While the military commission procedures also entitle defendants the right to select as counsel either a military officer or a civilian of their own choice, they limit potential candidates. The civilian counsel chosen must: (1) be a U.S. citizen; (2) be admitted to practice law in the United States; (3) not have been the subject of any sanction or disciplinary action by any court, bar, or other competent governmental authority for relevant misconduct; (4) be determined eligible for access to classified information; and (5) have signed a written agreement to comply with all applicable commission regulations. 170 One could argue that these limitations effectively nullify a detainee's right under GPW to choose counsel freely.
171
Military commissions would be appropriate if they would only be used to try violations of the law of war and if they provided the essential procedural safeguards for the accused. 172 The right to appeal is very important, especially in a court specifically devised to deliver the death penalty. The neutrality of the judges would also need to be assured either by appeal to a civilian court or by the use of federal judges on military commissions.
The current United States position on the captured terrorists' status is not shared in recent U.S. case law. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the court reviewed the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus. 173 The petitioner challenged the lawfulness of the Defense Secretary to try him for alleged war crimes before a military commission convened under the "special" Military Order instead of before a court-martial convened under the UCMJ. 174 The court held that the government's "attempt to separate the Taliban from al Qaeda for the Geneva Convention purposes finds no support in the structure of the Conventions themselves, which are triggered by the place of the conflict and not by what particular faction a fighter is associated with." 115 The court stated that whether a combatant was entitled to the "full panoply of Convention protections" offered by triggering of Common Article 2, or only the "more limited protections afforded by Common Article 3 ... the Third Geneva Convention applies to all persons detained in Afghanistan during the hostilities there." 4 Id. at 155. 5 Id. at 161 (emphasis added). ' 6 Id. at 163. In full, Art. 102 of the GPW holds that:
The court stated that the government's position would "only weaken the United States' own ability to demand application of the Geneva Conventions abroad."
177
The most significant argument against military commissions is that, no matter how fair they may be in practice, they lack the "perceived legitimacy crucial to reconstructing societies and judicial systems" in the wake of serious international crimes.
178 All these arguments support the fact that these ex post facto determinations after the commencement of the GWOT are the wrong way for the world's only super power to conduct terrorist prosecutions. Such determinations should have been made in advance of capturing terrorists. Consequently, trials in U.S. federal courts or in international courts would provide significantly greater procedural protections than military commissions.
IV. Applicability of International Criminal Law
A. Terrorism and International Criminal Responsibility
Terrorism as a Discrete International Crime
The concept of international crime is considerably ambiguous. In international law, there is particularly no agreed-upon definition of terrorism and hence no international crime of terrorism. 179 Rather, there are treaty provisions for suppression of certain acts, such as "aircraft hijacking" or "drug trafficking." Almost every international crime is subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the states and can be based on customary law or a binding treaty.
182
There are three main facets of terrorism in international law: (1) the acts must constitute a criminal offense under most national legal systems (e.g., assault, murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, extortion, bombing, torture, arson); 183 (2) the acts must be aimed at spreading terror (i.e., fear and intimidation) by means of violent action or the threat directed against a state or a particular group of people; 184 and (3) they must be politically, religiously, or ideologically motivated.
185
Terrorist acts are criminal whether perpetrated by individuals acting as members of a terrorist group or by state officials.
186
In order to have an international element, terrorist acts must show a nexus with either an international or internal armed conflict.
187 They must involve state authorities ami exhibit a transnational dimension. Acts of international terrorism are not confined to the territory of one state, but cross borders and significantly jeopardize the security of other states.
188
This international element is evidenced by the provisions of several international treaties.
189
Not all terrorist acts amount to international crimes. Terrorist activities caixied out within a state are criminal offenses punishable under the law of the relevant state.
190 Although other states may be bound by treaty obligations to cooperate in prosecuting the terrorist perpetrators, it does not render a domestic terrorist act an international offense. 191 Terrorist acts amount to discrete international crimes when: (1) they are not limited in their effects to one state only, but transcend national boundaries as far as the persons, the means, and the violence involved are concerned; (2) they are carried out with the support or the toleration of the state where the terrorist organization is located; 19 " (3) they are a concern for the whole international community and a threat to the peace; 194 or (4) they are very serious or large-scale. 195 Today the world has encountered a new kind of terrorism that requires new types of legislation and strategies.
196
International criminal law must constantly evolve in order to meet the new terrorist challenges.
Individual Criminal Responsibility
Under international criminal law, direct responsibility attaches to those who order, plan, or aid and abet by acting in common criminal enterprise with others for the commission of a crime. 197 In the September 11th attacks, directly responsible perpetrators are those who hijacked the planes and killed the passengers and others.'
98
Those who assisted them in various ways are responsible too. 199 There are numerous decisions holding that terrorist attacks cannot be considered offenses of a political character. 200 Violent crimes committed by terrorists and other political activists do not constitute political offenses unless the crimes form part of an action aimed to overthrow the state.
201
Unlike most fields of international law, the primary obligations imposed by international criminal law are on individuals, not on states. 202 In many ways, the main purpose of international criminal law is to deter and punish individuals 192 who commit international crimes. 203 International law recognizes the right of states to exercise jurisdiction over individual perpetrators of international crimes.
204 Jurisdiction may be exercised by: (1) the state where the crime occurred; (2) the state of nationality of the suspects; (3) the state of nationality of the victims; and, (4) for certain serious international crimes, all states, based on universal jurisdiction.
205
International jurisdiction can be exercised by the state on whose territory a crime is committed. 206 Many other states lost nationals in the September 11th attacks. International law allows them to exercise jurisdiction as well. 207 Moreover, the September 11th attacks amount to international crimes under international law due to their international character and any state may prosecute those crimes.
B. A Historical Look at Prosecuting International Terrorism
The Search for International Consensus
Historical efforts for prosecuting terrorism were at first unsuccessful. The reason for failure in prosecuting terrorism is that "[sjtates, acting in accordance with their political or ideological preferences refuse requests for the extradition of terrorists to whom they offer refuge, financial support and even weapons."
209
For example, the former Taliban government in Afghanistan refused to extradite al Qaeda terrorists.
210 Throughout history, most counter-terrorism measures came from the domestic level, not the international level.
2 " Therefore, it is unfortunate that international organizations, such as the United Nations, have been a "secondary combatant" in the GWOT. An endeavor towards the jurisdiction of terrorists in international courts followed the assassination of King Alexander I of former Yugoslavia in Marseille on October 9, 1934 . This event led to the "Convention for the Prevention and Repression of Terrorism" and the "Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court" in 1937. 213 Numerous states had been expected to sign these two conventions, however, neither convention ever entered into force. 214 In 1954, the "Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind" proposed punishment for supporting terrorist activities in another state as well as punishment for toleration of organized activities aimed at the carrying out of terrorist acts in another state. 215 This draft code was never entered into force either.
216
On the other hand, the U.N. General Assembly imposed a duty on states "to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting, or participating in terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the act referred to in the present paragraph involves a threat or use of force." 217 However, the attempt made by the United States to create legally binding cooperation through the adoption of a "Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of Terrorism" was unsuccessful.
218
The "European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism" was signed under the auspices of the Council of Europe by seventeen member states on January 27, 1977 and came into force in 1978. 219 This convention expresses clearly its member states' conviction that "extradition is a particularly effective measure" for ensuring the perpetrators of acts of terrorism do not escape 213 Bassiouni, supra note 193, at 765. 214 Id. prosecution and punishment. 220 The convention provides that certain terrorist acts shall not be regarded as political offenses for the purposes of extradition.
221
In other international criminal law conventions on terrorism, the tendency has been to include very short provisions relating to prosecution and extradition. 222 The political considerations in international criminal law have been a deterrent to the inclusion of terrorism in those conventions. 223 Terrorism has not been included among the international crimes enumerated in either the "Draft International Criminal Code" or the "Statutes for the International Criminal Courts." 224 The reason for this probably lies in the desire to avoid political and ideological conflicts with the liberation movements that to some extent make use of terrorist methods. 
The Lockerbie Case and the United Nations Actions
The general strategy in prosecuting international terrorism was changed by a major event -the Lockerbie bombing. This event prompted an international effort against terrorism. In 1988, Pan Am flight 103 was downed in a terrorist attack over Lockerbie, Scotland. Following an investigation, the United States and the United Kingdom indicted two Libyan nationals and demanded their extradition from Libya. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999). 221 See ARNOLD, supra note 9, at 31. 222 Wise, supra note 213, at 26. 223 ADDICOTT, supra note 16, at 2. 224 MURPHY, supra note 8, at 297. 225 Id.
226 Drumble, supra note 3, at 65. 227 DINSTEIN, supra note 20, at 279. . . . ,"
228 Resolution 731 was a warning to the Libyan government and to all other governments involved in terrorism. It established an important precedent requiring states to treat terrorism as a crime and to hold states responsible if they do not.
229
The United States government responded, "[t]his type of concerted multilateral response to terrorism serves as an important deterrent to states considering support for terrorist acts or groups." 230 The next Security Council actions concerning the Lockerbie case established sanctions against Libya in response to its "failure to respond positively" to the earlier requests.
231
Resolution 748 declared intentions to punish Libya through an arms embargo and travel restrictions on Libyan nationals.
232
Finally in 1998, the issue was resolved. Libya agreed to allow the suspects to be tried in a court in the Netherlands, under Scottish law. 233 On January 31, 2001, the Scottish Court in the Netherlands rendered its verdict in the Pan Am 103 bombing trial. 234 The court found one of the two Libyan defendants guilty of murder and sentenced him to a minimum of twenty years imprisonment.
235
The Lockerbie case is very important for the future of multilateral action against international terrorism because it shows the increasing power of international law. Resolution 1368, issued immediately after the September 11th attacks, "would not have been adopted were it not for the precedents set with the sanctions regimes in the 1990s." Taliban.
238 It required economic sanctions and embargos on the Taliban.
239
Osama bin Laden was already under indictment for the embassy bombings. 240 It also demanded the extradition of Osama Bin Laden to "appropriate authorities in a country where he has been indicted, or to appropriate authorities in a country where he will be returned to such a country, or to appropriate authorities in a country where he will be arrested and effectively brought to justice."
241
Both the Lockerbie case and the resolution concerning the Taliban required the extradition of the suspects to the countries in which they were indicted. They raised another issue of international law: the aut dedere aut judiciare principal essentially requires states either "extradite" an indicted person or "prosecute" him. 242 However, it is very poorly defined and leaves ambiguous which part takes priority -to extradite or to prosecute. 243 It is not clear under what circumstances either should be required.
Terrorism and the International Criminal Court a. The Background to the Rome Statute
The Rome Treaty of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is one of the most important developments in international criminal law. 244 The ICC is the first permanent international tribunal with a global jurisdiction to try individuals for criminal violations of international humanitarian law. 245 The ICC aimed to help deter international crimes while protecting international peace and security.
246
The failings of national prosecutions such as those in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda suggest that international prosecutions are the best 238 Id. 239 Id. 240 Robertson, supra note 141, at 226. method for ensuring procedural rights for terrorist prosecutions." The ICC seems to provide a useful tool for prosecuting terrorist suspects, because it reduces the appearance of victor's justice. The ICC's success depends upon acceptance by the international community. However, the ICC is not a serious alternative to the present system of criminal jurisdiction.
248
The court shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.
249
Complementarity holds that the ICC may only exercise jurisdiction if a "good-faith prosecution is not carried out by the accused's state." 250 The ICC is a court of last resort.
In the rush to create a powerful and independent court in Rome, there was a refusal to constrain the ICC's powers in any meaningful way. 251 The treaty created a self-initiating prosecutor, answerable to no state or institution other than the ICC itself. 252 The United states had serious concerns about the ICC's power.
[T]he treaty threatens the sovereignty of the United States. The Court, as constituted today, claims the authority to detain and try American citizens, even though our democratically-elected representatives have not agreed to be bound by the treaty. While sovereign nations have the authority to try non-citizens who have committed crimes against their citizens or in their territory, the United States has never recognized the right of an international organization to do so absent consent or a U.N. Security Council mandate .... [W] e believe that by putting U.S. officials, and our men and women in uniform, at risk of politicized prosecutions, the ICC will complicate U.S. military cooperation with many friends and allies who will now have a treaty obligation to hand over U.S. nationals to the Court -even over U.S. objections .... The United States has a unique role and responsibility to help preserve international peace and security. At any given time, U.S. forces are located in close to 100 nations around the 247 ARNOLD, supra note 9, at 2. 248 Martinez, supra note 14, at 51. 249 See ICC Statute, supra note 237 art. 1. 250 Martinez, supra note 14, at 52. 251 See Garry D. Solis, The ICC and Mad Prosecutors, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 1103 (Barry Carter et al. eds., 4th ed. 2003) ; Gallant, supra note 236, at 710. 254 The United States was apparently concerned that if it had remained a signatory to the treaty, the United States might be obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. 255 Shortly after the ICC was established, Congress passed the "American Service Members Protection Act of 2002" to try to insulate American troops from prosecution by the ICC. 256 The law also authorized the President to use "all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release of United States citizens held by or for the ICC."
257 It barred the United States government from cooperating with the ICC. 258 To protect its soldiers from the ICC, the United States asked in 2002 that the U.N. Security Council pass a resolution that protected U.N. peacekeepers from non-ratifying states (e.g., the United States) from the jurisdiction of the ICC. 259 Under the Rome Treaty, the Security Council has the power to delay any prosecution for renewable twelve-month periods. 260 The United States, by threatening to withdraw its peacekeepers from Bosnia, East Timor, and other regions, proposed a solution that would automatically renew every year unless the U.N. Security Council affirmatively cancelled it -a decision that the United States could veto. 261 The United States finally settled for Resolution 1422.
262
As a second protection, the United States began seeking, "as a condition of foreign aid," that other countries sign bilateral agreements promising immunity to the United States troops on their territory. 263 These so-called "Article 98
Agreements" have been signed by 92 countries; including those who are parties to the ICC. 264 However, it is interesting to note that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has jurisdiction over the United States service members 265 and, unlike with the ICC, the United States did not object to this jurisdiction.
b. Exclusion of Terrorism from the International Criminal Court Statute
The captured terrorists cannot be tried by international courts because terrorism is not listed as a crime in the statutes of those courts. It is interesting to note that, during the Rome Conference, several states expressed the wish to include acts of international terrorism under the ICC jurisdiction.
267
For example, Turkey supported the argument that international terrorism should fall within the ICC jurisdiction under the heading of "crimes against humanity." During the eighth session of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court (PCICC), Turkey submitted a document in which it asserted that acts of terrorism constituted some of the most significant threats to international peace and security. 269 Moreover, it opined that the global community should not have to wait to amend the Rome Statute and to recognize terrorism as a particularly international crime.
270
Turkey suggested a pragmatic approach to tackling the issue of terrorism and to broadening the jurisdiction of the court. Turkey argued that law must adapt to reality. 271 It also underlined two possible avenues by which to enact
Crimes Courts: The United States Would Cut Aid for Allies Who Back Prosecuting Troops, A.F. TIMES (Dec. 13,2004) .
effective changes that would place terrorism in a specific category of crimes.
272
Turkey's objective was to create a category of crimes separate from those already explicitly enumerated in the Rome Statute. 273 However, the proposal to include international terrorism under the ICC jurisdiction as a crime against humanity met with disapproval. 274 The jurisdiction over international terrorism was never explicitly granted to the ICC. The non-inclusion of terrorism as a crime against humanity was one reason that Turkey abstained from voting to adopt the Rome Statute.
275
The United States delegation firmly opposed the inclusion of terrorism in the ICC Statute. 276 The United States' objection was reasonable because, as mentioned above, 277 there is no international consensus on the definition of international terrorism as a crime under international law. The American delegates provided four grounds to justify their decision to reject the proposed inclusion of terrorism: (1) the offense was not well defined; (2) in their view the inclusion of this crime would politicize the ICC; (3) some acts of terrorism were not sufficiently serious to warrant prosecution by an international tribunal; and (4) prosecution and punishment by national courts were considered more efficient than by international tribunals.
278
Some still argue that acts of international terrorism qualify as crimes against humanity under the ICC Statute and that crimes of terrorism can be tried on an international level.
279 Turkey argued that terrorism was an act of crimes against humanity. However, terrorism cannot be a crime against humanity because it does not include acts "part of a widespread or systematic attack."
280
Although the ICC could assert jurisdiction over acts of international 2,2 Id. 273 Id. 274 Schabas, supra note 13, at 925. 275 Proulx, supra note 25, at 1027. 276 MURPHY, supra note 9, at 317. terrorism, 281 terrorism is omitted from the ICC's jurisdiction on the basis of the lack of an accepted definition. 282 Even if there were a universally accepted definition of terrorism and the ICC Statute included terrorist acts as crimes, the September 11th attacks could not be adjudicated there for two reasons: (1) the United States has not ratified the Rome Treaty establishing the ICC; and (2) the terrorist attacks occurred before the actual establishment of the ICC. The ICC's prospective jurisdiction commenced after July 1, 2002. 283 Moreover, the ICC cannot become a viable alternative because the ICC will be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions and the United States is willing and able to exercise criminal jurisdiction over these crimes. Therefore, the ICC is not a serious alternative to the present system of criminal jurisdiction over the captured terrorists.
C. Universal Jurisdiction of Terrorism "International criminal law aspires to prosecute alleged perpetrators of grievous human rights abuses." 284 In the past three decades, the concept of "universal jurisdiction" and the enforcement of international criminal law have expanded. 285 International law provides that there are certain offenses over which any nation may have jurisdiction. 286 These offenses are considered so heinous that any state may prosecute them. 287 Several crimes have such universal interest that international conventions have been aimed at their elimination: these include piracy, slave trade, war crimes, hijacking, sabotage in civil aircraft, and genocide. 288 These features in particular were underscored by the U.N. Security Council in Resolution 1368, adopted in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks. 289 The resolution "unequivocally" condemned "in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington D.C., and Pennsylvania" and regarded such acts, "like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security."
290
The resolution also calls on all states "to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of these terrorist attacks; ... those responsible for aiding, supporting, or harboring the perpetrators, organizing, and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable."
291
Today national courts play a significant role in terrorist prosecutions. Nearly every international crime is subject to territorial jurisdiction of the courts of some states.
292 National courts are close to the acts in question. National courts often have the best access to information, evidence, and testimony about the alleged events.
293
There are, however, significant dangers in national prosecution of international crimes. First, national courts are more likely to be biased or politically motivated than the international courts. The very proximity to the crime, the local press coverage, and the searing pain of knowing victims and survivors may undermine the fairness of the procedure. 294 Second, the quality of justice in national courts differs dramatically. While some states have welldeveloped legal systems, others lack even the most rudimentary legal tools. 295 Third, in the prosecution of international crimes, there is often a need to convince both a local and a global polity of the fairness of the proceedings and the legitimacy of justice rendered.
296 National courts are least likely to be viewed as fair and unbiased by outside observers.
297
There is a growing trend to include terrorism in universal jurisdiction.
298
International terrorism is so heinous and so widely condemned that any state 289 forum. Although the role of national courts in the prosecution of international crimes is increasing, alternative forums have been proposed including international criminal courts or "hybrid" courts composed of a mixture of national and foreign judges. 308 Of course, the ICC is not the only model in prosecuting terrorists. If national courts do not want to or are unable to try terrorism offenses, there are several other models for prosecuting international crimes. Ad hoc international tribunals may still be created under the auspices of the U.N. as done in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 309 International cooperation in prosecuting terrorists is essential in the GWOT, even if international criminal law enforcement is not perfect. 310 Trial before international tribunal could occur before various panels of judges -even judges from Muslim countries. Such diversity could prevent potential accusations of "victor's justice." 3 "
It is necessary to develop international criminal law enforcement. States must delegate authority to judicial bodies for international criminal law to apply. 312 International criminal law cannot enjoy long-term credibility if it becomes an instrument of hegemony for powerful states. 313 All countries must work together to bring the terrorists to justice. 314 International criminal courts will only help to ensure that domestic jurisdiction will conform to the minimum standards of international law. 315 Most terrorist cases will still be dealt with in domestic courts. Terrorism will more effectively be addressed by national prosecutions, but states can take coordinated action if necessary.
b. Semi-Internationalized Courts
The semi-internationalized courts are part of the domestic justice systems of their host countries, but include a mix of local and international judges who apply both international and domestic law. 316 operation in East Timor and Kosovo. 317 They will soon come into effect in Sierra Leone, and may eventually begin operation in Cambodia. 318 These courts tend to meet the needs of the domestic state as well as the demands of the international community, which "often contributes finances, resources, and judges."
319 Internationalized domestic courts can provide some of the legitimacy of an international tribunal, as foreign judges are more likely to be impartial and viewed as such both by the domestic and the global community. 320 Likewise, internationalized domestic courts can demonstrate the general global consensus that international crimes will not be tolerated. 321 These semi-internationalized courts are also far easier to establish and much less expensive to operate than their fully internationalized counterparts. 322 
Extradition of Terrorists
Extradition poses a problem when terrorists face the death penalty in the requesting state. 323 In recent years, the United States has extended the death penalty to more and more crimes, including terrorist crimes, at both the state and the federal level. 324 The issue puts into focus the competing functions of extradition law, mutual legal assistance between states in criminal matters and the human rights of the fugitive. 325 The issue of extradition was discussed in Soering v. United Kingdom}
26
The case was about an extradition request by the United States to the United Kingdom for Jens Soering, on charges of capital murder. The European Court of Human Rights held that if the United Kingdom extradited, this would violate article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
327
Article 3 of ECHR prohibits inhumane and degrading treatment. 328 The European Court of Human Rights noted that it was not typical to consider potential violations of the ECHR. 329 However, it was an exception where extradition would violate article 3 by reason of foreseeable consequences in the requesting state. 330 In Soering, the European Court of Human Rights did not address whether the death penalty per se violated this right. 331 Rather, the European Court of Human Rights viewed the fugitive's subjection to the socalled "death-row phenomenon" as the applicable question.
332
Death row phenomenon refers to the suffering endured by persons who spend years on death row in a state of uncertainty about whether they will be executed. 333 It has ceased for now to be a significant source of friction between the abolitionist nations of Western Europe and the United States, given the former's move toward an absolute position against the death penalty, and to extraditing death eligible suspects.
334
The international trend against the death penalty has become clearer and this development has greatly complicated the United States' extradition relations with other countries.
335
When the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death under the laws of the requesting state, and the laws of the requested state do not permit such punishment for that offense, extradition may be refused unless the requesting state provides such assurances as the requested state considers sufficient that the death penalty shall not be imposed, or, if imposed shall not be executed .... Reviving the factors for and against unconditional extradition, [it is evident] that to order extradition of the respondents without obtaining Id. Id. Bassiouni, supra note 194, at 793. assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed would violate the principles of fundamental justice.
33(> It is incorrect to say that the captured terrorists cannot get a fair trial in the United States. Like all justice systems, the United States has serious problems, " [b] ut in terms of fairness and the rights of defense," it is far better than its competitors. 337 The United States has historically treated terrorist acts as crimes to be addressed by domestic law enforcement authorities. 338 The United States is also a party to several international treaties that apply to particular forms of terrorism. Most of these conventions require the parties to establish criminal jurisdiction over the terrorists. 339 However, the United States has changed its conception of "terrorism as a crime" to "terrorism as an act of war." 340 The September 11th attacks greatly impacted this change. The law of armed conflict has assumed greater importance in the GWOT. 341 Terrorism is now considered to be a national security issue to be addressed by the armed forces. 342 In the GWOT, it is important that the United States have the enforcement of domestic criminal laws without the interference of other nations or international bodies. Due to lack of political will by some of the European governments, the international judicial assistance mechanism is not functioning properly. 343 In the past few decades, most European countries adopted the policy of "not to extradite and not to punish" terrorists. 344 Today certain foreign states are hesitant to extradite suspects to the United States.
The concern is that when certain terrorists, who may be tried for capital offenses, are caught, some countries opposed to the death penalty will probably not extradite them to the United States. The fugitives accused of terrorist offenses, for whom capture is imminent; might surrender to the authorities of a state that will not extradite them to the United States where they may face the death penalty for their crimes. Even Osama bin Laden can surrender to British, Spanish, German or French authorities. This might trigger a significant political debate between the United States and those countries.
V. Conclusion
Given the procedural mechanism of military commissions for trying the captured terrorists, it is evident that the policy of the United States on terrorist prosecutions needs a major revision. Procedural protections must be provided for the captured terrorists. In part II, it is argued that many of the problems the United States faces in the GWOT can only be effectively solved through international cooperation, and international law is the best available tool to gain international support.
As discussed in part III, since the existing systems of national prosecutions do not provide enough protections for the captured terrorists, other means should be explored. The primary concern should be to protect defendants from potentially unfair trials. "[International law and international security do not conflict, but rather reinforce each other."
348 Part IV reveals that under existing international political conditions, only if states become willing to punish international terrorism, is it possible to adopt an international convention and an appropriate modification of national laws.
The September 11th attacks were no different from past terrorist attacks and they constitute a crime of terrorism. A criminal justice process is one of the more appropriate responses to the September 11th attacks. Prosecuting captured terrorists in federal or international courts rather than military commissions can help human rights become more effective, discredit terrorism, and encourage a greater legitimization of international law all over the world. The enforcement of international criminal law is never perfect, but it may provide the basis for terrorist prosecutions. The successful trials of Lockerbie and the first World Trade Center bombers suggest that domestic courts and specialized international tribunals are at least as well equipped to handle such cases. Although the United States has been reluctant to cede authority to a foreign sovereign in prosecuting terrorists, some ceding of authority is necessary because the GWOT requires cooperation from allies. 'L L, 97 (2003) .
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